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Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.: Restricting
Subject Matter Jurisdiction for Foreign Litigants
The rapid internationalization in recent years of the U.S. securi-
ties market' has prompted a controversy among commentators and
judges over the extent of the extraterritorial application of the an-
tifraud provision of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act).2 In Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 3 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia set forth the most restrictive test to date
for determining the caliber of domestic conduct required to sustain
subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving domestic conduct alleg-
edly involved in the perpetration of a securities fraud on investors
outside this country. 4 In an opinion by Judge Bork, the court held
that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists only when the domestic
conduct comprises all the elements necessary to establish a violation
of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 5 This note examines the test de-
l Between 1971 and 1981, foreign investment in the U.S. domestic market increased
from $25.6 to $74 billion. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSiNEss 56
(Aug. 1981); U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusNEss 21 (Aug. 1973). For
a discussion of the increasing internationalization of U.S. securities markets, see Thomas,
Extraterritoriality in an Era of Internationalization of the Securities .,,arkets: The Need To Revisit
Domestic Policies, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 453, 453 (1983).
2 The primary antifraud provisions are section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982), and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1987).
For a discussion of the controversy, see Thomas, supra note 1, at 459-60 (presenting a
conflict of law approach to subject matter jurisdiction when adjudicating transnational se-
curities fraud cases); Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1314-16 (1985) (advocating common jurisdictional
standards for the extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions).
3 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id. Section 10 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of anv
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use'of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of'the mails or of any'
facility of any national ,securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a ma-
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vised by the court in Zoelsch, the reasoning underlying the court's
test, and the variable effects of that test on judicial economy, capital
formation in the United States, and the ability of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to police effectively domestic securities
activities.
In Zoelsch, West German investors brought securities fraud
claims against Arthur Andersen, an American accounting firm. 6 The
investment concerned a tax shelter created by Loescher, a West Ger-
man corporation, which would channel funds to a U.S. limited part-
nership based in Florida. 7 An audit report, distributed to the
investors beforehand, was prepared by Arthur Andersen & Co.
GmbH (GmbH), also a West German corporation. 8 Arthur Ander-
sen was not directly involved in the solicitation of subject investors
or in the preparation of any documents that induced securities
purchases. 9 The only connection between Arthur Andersen and the
alleged fraud was a reference suggesting that GmbH had consulted
with Arthur Andersen regarding some of the data contained in the
audit report.' 0 Affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia failed to find a theory of liability in the com-
plaint to support federal jurisdiction over the securities law claims.Il
Judge Bork adopted the Second Circuit terminology and concluded
that the domestic activity was "merely preparatory" to any fraud per-
petrated on the West German investors and did not "directly cause"
their losses.12 By adding the additional requirement that domestic
conduct contain all the elements of a section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 vio-
lation, the court attempted to clarify the line between domestic con-
duct that is "merely preparatory" and conduct that "directly caused"
the losses .13
According to the Zoelsch test, jurisdiction is appropriate when
fraudulent statements or misrepresentations "originate in the United
States, are made with scienter and in connection with the purchase
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
o Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 28.
7 Id.
8 Id. GmbH is a separate corporate branch of Arthur Andersen. The investors
brought a separate suit against GmbH in West Germany. Id.
) Id. at 29. The investors' complaint alleged that Arthur Andersen provided false
and misleading information to GmbH knowing that this information would be used in
GrnbH's audit report and would be relied on by investors. Id.
10 Id.
Id. at 36.
12 Id. at 35 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992-93 (2d Cir.),
cer. denied, 423 U.S.. 1018 (1975)).
I3 Id. at 30-31.
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or sale of securities, and 'directly cause' the harm to those who claim
to be defrauded, even if reliance and damages occur elsewhere.' 4
The court reasoned that its test, a restatement of the Second Cir-
cuit's,15 was more consistent with the congressional intent of the se-
curities laws than tests adopted by other circuits.' 6 The court
criticized the policy approach used by other circuits in their jurisdic-
tional analyses.' 7 In assessing the jurisdictional theory proposed by
the plaintiffs, the court concluded that the theory was "novel" and
bore no relation to the Act's purpose or to tests employed in other
circuit courts for determining jurisdiction.' 8
The provisions of the 1934 Act provide a broad grant ofjurisdic-
tion,' 9 but the legislative history does not reveal the congressional
intent regarding the Act's extraterritorial application.20 Federal
14 Id. at 33. Judge Bork pointed out that standing to sue may limit extraterritorial
jurisdiction. According to Judge Bork, the Zoelsch test "recognizes that the issue of federal
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct... 'in no way depends on the merits of the plain-
tiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal .. .[but] often turns on the nature and
source of the claim asserted.' " Id. at 33 n.4 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975)). In Warth the Court concluded that "the source of the plaintiff's claim to relief
assumes critical importance with respect to the prudential rules of [judicial self restraint]
that ... serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes." 422 U.S. at 500.
For a discussion of the doctrine of standing, see Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separa-
tion of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 82 (concluding that the Court should allow
Congress a greater role in defining standing by granting standing to virtually all plaintiffs
asserting statutory claims unless the statute or its legislative history clearly supports a con-
trary conclusion); Shapiro,Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 552-53 (1985)
(arguing that the prudential aspect of the standing doctrine permits a court to exercise
discretion in deciding whether to accord standing to a person seeking to assert another
person's rights or raising a generalized grievance shared by a large class of citizens).
15 Id. at 31.
16 Id. at 31-32. The court stated: "Were it not for the Second Circuit's preeminence
in the field of securities law, and our desire to avoid a multiplicity ofjurisdictional tests, we
might be inclined to doubt that an American court should ever assert jurisdiction over
domestic conduct that causes loss to foreign investors." Id. at 32.
17 Id. at 32-33. Judge Wald refused to accept the majority's rationale for rejecting the
jurisdictional standards adopted by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 36 (Wald,
J., concurring).
18 Id. at 36.
19 The Securities and Exchange Commission defines interstate commerce to include
trade, commerce, transportation or communication ... between any foreign country and
any State." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1982). The federal district courts are given jurisdic-
tion over suits brought to enforce the securities laws. Id. at § 78aa. Section 30(b) of the
1934 Act, however, provides that "[t]he provisions of this title .. .shall not apply to any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without thejurisdiction of the United
States ...." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1983). Because this section provides a somewhat am-
biguous mandate, courts often focus on the jurisdictional limits defined by international
law. See Note, supra note 2, at 1314 & n.24.
2o The reach of the 1934 Act is not apparent from its legislative history. See Hearings
on Stock Exchange Regulation Before the House Conini. on Interstate and Foreign Coninerce. 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30 ("Congress did not consider how far
American courts should have jurisdiction to decide cases involving predominantly foreign
securities transactions with some link to the United States."); IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d
909,912 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The SEC has not attempted to define the transnational scope
of the anti-fraud provisions by any exercise of its rulemaking powers."); "Unfortunately,
the legislative history is silent respecting the jurisdictional scope of the questions at issue
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courts were without congressional guidance when confronted with
domestic conduct allegedly involved in the perpetration of a securi-
ties fraud on investors outside the United States. As a result, the
circuit courts developed two tests forjurisdiction. 2 1 In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook 22 the court sustained jurisdiction based on an effects test. 23
The court held that subject matter jurisdiction existed when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national securi-
ties exchange and when the failure to extend jurisdiction will detri-
mentally affect the interests of U.S. investors. 2
4
The Second Circuit also fashioned a conduct test as a basis for
extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.2 5 In Leasco a foreign inves-
tor, a wholly-owned American subsidiary, brought suit alleging a rule
lOb-5 violation against a foreign corporation.2 6 The plaintiff
here." SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
Murano, Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 298, 300 (1984) ("the securities laws offer little explicit
guidance as to their transnational applicability"); Thomas, supra note 1, at 455-59 (discuss-
ing the "dearth" of legislative history and the tests set forth in the case law for asserting
subject matter jurisdiction in transnational fraud cases).
21 See Grunethal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983) (limiting jurisdic-
tion to the perpetration of fraudulent acts and refusing jurisdiction when the domestic
activity was "merely preparatory" and the bulk of activity occurred abroad); Cornfield, 619
F.2d at 920-21 (the determination of whether to extend jurisdiction depends on the
amount of domestic conduct compared to the amount of conduct abroad); Continental
Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979) (granting jurisdiction
when the defendants' domestic conduct was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, was
significant with respect to its accomplishment, and involved the use of the mails and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 (application of the U.S.
antifraud provisions is proper "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudu-
lent scheme" occurs domestically); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir.
1975) ("jurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and does
not extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where
the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries ...."); Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.) (restricting jurisdiction for foreign litigants to
cases in which domestic conduct directly causes the losses from the sale of securities), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that the 1934 Act was intended to protect against
fraud in the sale or purchase of securities whether or not they are traded on national
markets and the 1934 Act is applicable to transactions in foreign securities consummated
abroad when fraudulent acts occurred domestically).
22 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), partially rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
23 Id. at 208. Schoenbaum involved U.S. investors who purchased foreign securities on
U.S. securities exchanges. Id. at 204-05. The court was concerned with protecting U.S.
securities markets from the effects of fraudulent foreign transactions in U.S. securities. Id.
at 208-09.
24 Id. The effects test is not applicable here because neither U.S. securities nor inves-
tors were involved. The plaintiffs relied on Arthur Andersen's domestic conduct as the
basis for jurisdiction. Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
25 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
26 Id. at 1337. Because the plaintiff was a wholly-owned American subsidiary, the
Second Circuit analyzed jurisdiction as if the litigation involved a domestic plaintiff and a
foreign defendant. Id. at 1338.
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purchased a security not registered with the SEC, and the sale oc-
curred abroad. The plaintiff alleged, however, that the purchase was
induced by conduct in the United States consisting of communica-
tions by mail and telephone, and in person.2 7 The court held that
the 1934 Act was intended to protect against fraud in the sale or
purchase of securities, whether or not the securities were traded on
organized U.S. markets. The court also held that jurisdiction was
available when a defendant's fraudulent acts took place within the
United States. 28
The Second Circuit took the Leasco analysis further in Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc.,2 9 holding that the kind of conduct necessary for
a finding of jurisdiction varies depending on whether or not the
plaintiff is a U.S. citizen.3 0 According to the court, U.S. securities
laws "[d]o not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States, unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses." 3' The Second
Circuit later limited the domestic conduct sufficient to sustain juris-
27 Id. at 1331.
28 Id. at 1335-37. According to the court's decision, jurisdiction premised on a con-
duct analysis should be determined by comparing the domestic and foreign conduct. Id. at
1337. The court, however, indicated that to extend jurisdiction, the fraudulent conduct
and misrepresentations that induced the foreign purchase must occur domestically. The
court stated:
[W]e must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about the point, it
would not have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes
to the United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securi-
ties abroad-a purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace. While
as earlier stated, we doubt that impact on an American company and its
shareholders would suffice to make the statute applicable if the misconduct
had occurred solely in England, we think it tips the scales of applicability when
substantial iisrepresentations were made in the United States.
Id. at 1337 (emphasis added).
In its attempt to define the jurisdictional boundaries of the antifraud provisions, the
court relied on section 17 of the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. Id. The section, which is entitled "Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to
Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest within Territory," states that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the con-
duct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized in its
territory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
29) 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
: o Id. at 993. In Besch, a U.S. citizen brought a class action on behalf of himself and
other investors against a foreign corporation for securities fraud. The plaintiff class con-
sisted of U.S. residents both in the United States and abroad and foreign residents abroad.
Id. at 978-84. In establishing different standards for foreign and domestic investors, the
court expressed its desire to conserve U.S. administrative resources and its sensltivity to
issues of comity and fairness. Id. at 985.
31 Id. The court also held that the federal securities laws applied to sales of securities
to American residents in the United States whether or not acts of material importance
occurred in the United States and to American residents abroad only if acts of material
importance in ihe United States significantly contributed io such losses. Id.
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diction to the perpetration of "fraudulent acts themselves" rather
than "mere preparatory activities." '3 2 The Bersch court, however, rea-
soned that when a court is "confronted with transactions that are on
any view predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether
Congress would have wished" that U.S. securities laws applied or
whether the case could be adjudicated better in another forum. 33
In HT v. Cornfield, 34 the most recent Second Circuit decision ad-
dressing extraterritorial application of the Securities and Exchange
Act, the court granted jurisdiction in an action by a foreign invest-
ment trust and its liquidators against U.S. defendants. 35 The domes-
tic conduct in Cornfield consisted of improper accounting work and
the drafting of an allegedly fraudulent prospectus.3 6 The court
avoided establishing a definitive test and stated that no single factor
would be dispositive in future cases. Rather, the court used a balanc-
ing approach in assessing the sufficiency of conduct necessary to sus-
tain subject matter jurisdiction.3 7 According to the court, the
determination of whether the domestic activities directly caused the
foreigners' losses depended on the amount of domestic activity rela-
tive to the amount of foreign activity.38 While both Cornfield and
Bersch involved similar jurisdictional variables,39 the court in Cornfield
distinguished its jurisdictional determination. 40 The court stressed
that the domestic conduct in Bersch was merely preparatory, in con-
trast to the foreign conduct, which comprised the final and critical
conduct. Although the domestic conduct in Cornfield was also prepar-
32 lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975). Vlencap involved an action
brought by a foreign investment trust for fraud, conversion, and corporate waste against a
foreign corporation and other individual defendants. Id. at 1004-11. The court concluded
that the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction over a suit under the federal securi-
ties laws for damages or rescission by a defrauded foreign individual. Id. at 1017. The
court stated: "We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as
a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are ped-
dled only to foreigners." Id.
33 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985.
34 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
35 Id. at 919-21. The Second Circuit regarded the predominantly foreign
fundholders as the real party in interest and the American aiders and abetters, including
Arthur Andersen, as the true defendants. Id. at 918.
36 Id. at 918-21.
37 Id. The court stated:
It should be evident by now that "the presence or absence of any single
factor which was considered significant in other cases dealing with the ques-
tion of federal jurisdiction in transnational security cases is not necessarily
dispositive" in future cases. Hence we do not mean to suggest that either the
American nationality of the issuer or consummation of the transaction in the
United States is either a necessary or a sufficient factor, but rather the pres-
ence of both these factors points strongly toward applying the anti-fraud pro-
visions of our securities laws. Id. at 918 (quoting Continental Grain v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1979)).
38 Id. at 920-21.
' I Both cases involved foreign plaintiffs, domestic defendants, purchases abroad, and
effect abroad.
40 Cornfield, 619 F.2d at 920.
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atory, the court pointed out that there was no foreign counterpart.
The domestic conduct in Cornfield, therefore, was the sole and direct
cause of the loss. 4 1
Like the Second Circuit, the Third and Eighth circuits assert ju-
risdiction only when the domestic conduct directly causes the losses
elsewhere. 42 In contrast to the Second Circuit, these courts require
a lesser degree of domestic conduct to assert a claim under the U.S.
securities laws.4 3 These circuits have based adoption of a more lib-
eral jurisdictional standard on policy considerations consistent with
the perceived congressional intent of the antifraud provisions.44
The Third Circuit in SEC v. Kasser 45 held that the federal securi-
ties laws granted jurisdiction in transnational fraud cases "where at
least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme" oc-
curred domestically. 46 The court adopted dicta of the Second Cir-
cuit and argued that Congress did not intend to prohibit the SEC
from policing fraudulent securities activities within the United
States, even when the securities were sold only to foreigners. 47 In
determining whether the domestic conduct was sufficient to extend
jurisdiction, the court looked at the quantity of the defendants' do-
mestic activities and concluded that the domestic conduct was crucial
41 Id. The court stressed the lack of foreign activity in Cornfield which was "so domi-
nant in Bersch." As for the accounting work performed in both cases, the court in Cornfield
noted that there was some domestic accounting work in Bersch, but that in Cornfield all the
accounting work was and had to be done in the United States. Id. See Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
42 See Grunethal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1983); Continental
Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420 (8th Cir. 1979) (conduct in the United
States must be material and directly cause losses rather than merely preparatory); SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir.) (discussing whether the losses were directly caused by
the acts of the defendants within the United States), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
43 See Grunethal GmbH, 712 F.2d at 424-25; Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (federal
securities laws grant jurisdiction in transnational securities cases in which the domestic
conduct was in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its
accomplishment); Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114 (federal securities laws grant jurisdiction in
transnational securities cases "where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent
scheme" occurred domestically).
44 See Gimnethal GmbH, 712 F.2d at 424 ("the test used by the Third [Kasser] and
Eighth [Continental Grain] Circuits advances the policies underlying federal securities
laws"); Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421-22 ([T]he "general purpose of the securities
laws" is to "mandate the highest standards of conduct in securities transactions."); Kasser,
548 F.2d at 116 ("[T]he antifraud provisions of the 1933 and the 1934 Acts were designed
to insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this country in addi-
tion to protecting domestic markets and investors from the effects of fraud"). See also
United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1978) ("It is an absurd notion that
Congress intended activity in the United States involving American securities to be exempt
from the fraud provisions of the securities acts simply because the victims are not Ameri-
can citizens.").
45 548 F.2d at 109.
4( Id. at 114. Kasser involved an action brought by the SEC against foreign individuals
and corporations based on an alleged scheme to defraud a foreign corporation. Id. at 110-
12.
47 Id. at 113-14.
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to the consummation of the fraud. 48 Realizing that extraterritorial
jurisdiction called for a policy decision, the court proposed three
policy rationales for sUstaining jurisdiction.49
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit granted jurisdiction in Continental
Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 50 in which the only domestic conduct
consisted of telephone calls and letters.5 ' Citing Kasser, the court
stated that the federal securities laws grant jurisdiction in transna-
tional securities cases when at least some activity designed to further
a fraudulent scheme occurred domestically. 52 The court admitted
that its decision to grant jurisdiction was "largely a policy decision"
supported by the antifraud provisions, which evidence congressional
intent for a broad jurisdictional scope.5 3
Purportedly following the Second Circuit, the Zoelsch court es-
tablished a "litmus test" 54 for determining what domestic conduct
serves as a jurisdictional predicate under the securities laws for in-
vestors outside the United States. 5 5 The litmus test, adopted from
Bersch, added the lOb-5 requirement.5 6 In the two cases following
Bersch, however, the Second Circuit did not expressly distinguish be-
tween preparatory conduct and conduct directly causing the damage
abroad or explicitly establish a test requiring the domestic conduct
to contain all the elements of a section 10(b) violation. 57 Quoting
48 Id. at 115. The court stated: "Not only do we believe that the sum total of the
defendants' intranational actions was substantial, but we also question whether it can be
convincingly maintained that such acts within the United States did not directly cause any
extraterritorial losses .... [I]t is evident that the defendants' conduct occurring within the
borders of this nation was essential to the plan to defraud the Fund." Id.
49 Id. at 116. The court stated that a denial ofjurisdiction "may embolden those who
wish to defraud foreign securities purchasers or sellers to use the United States as a base
of operations" and may invite reciprocal responses in other countries. On the other hand,
the assertion of jurisdiction would "enhance the ability of the SEC to police vigorously"
securities activities within the United States. Id.
5o 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
51 Id. at 420.
52 Id. The court, however, refused to deviate from the language of the Second Cir-
cuit in Vencap and Bersch and stated that the domestic conduct cannot be merely prepara-
tory and must directly cause the losses. According to (he court: "finding subject matter
jurisdiction after such an analysis is consistent with the subjective territorial principle of
international law, the intent of Congress and the remedial purpose of the federal securities
laws." Id.
53 Id. at 421. The court does not go so far as to say that Congress intended the
antifraud provisions to apply extraterritorially when the domestic conduct is insubstantial.
The court, however, argued that the "range of significant conduct should ... be fairly
inclusive. This is consistent with the general purpose of the securities laws to mandate the
highest standards of conduct in securities transactions." Id.
54 See Morgenstern, Extrateuitorial pplication of ('nied States Securities Law: .41 Matrix
Analysis, 7 HASTINGS INT'l. & COMP. L. REV. 1, 31 n.l 1(1983).
' Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 33.
56" See id.
57 The court does not cite any cases distinguishing between preparatory conduct and
conduct directly causing the losses. From the opinion, however, it may be inferred that the
court was referring to Cornfield. In Corfield, the court clearly was hesitant to establish a
definite test. The court stated:
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the Eighth Circuit's decision in Continental, the court in Cornfield re-
fused to establish a definitive test. 58 Rather, the determination of
the jurisdictional sufficiency of domestic conduct depended on the
amount of domestic activity relative to the amount of foreign activ-
ity.59 The Second Circuit in Cornfield held that preparatory domestic
conduct was a sufficient jurisdictional predicate when there was no
foreign counterpart and when the preparatory domestic conduct was
the sole and direct cause of the losses.60
In addition to citing the Second Circuit as the basis for its juris-
dictional test, the Zoelsch court contended that its test was more con-
sistent with the congressional intent regarding the scope of the U.S.
securities laws than the more liberal approaches employed by other
circuits. 6 1 The court argued that these less restrictive jurisdictional
standards were essentially legislative policy considerations. 62 Ac-
cording to the court, the salient analysis was to determine what "ju-
risdiction Congress in fact thought about and conferred" when
drafting the 1934 Act, rather than "divining what 'Congress would
have wished.' "63 In analyzing congressional intent, the court stated
the presumption, employed in other contexts, that "Congress is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions. ", 64 The court further ar-
gued that it was "quite clear" from the congressional debates before
the enactment of the 1934 Act and from section 30(b) 6 5 of the 1934
Act that Congress was concerned with extraterritorial transactions
only if "they were part of a plan to harm American investors and
[W]e do not mean to suggest that either the American nationality of the is-
suer or consummation of the transaction in the United States is either a nec-
essary or sufficient factor . . . but rather that the presence of both these
factors points strongly toward applying the anti-fraud provisions of our se-
curities laws.
lIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980).
Moreover, the court in IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. i975), went
no further than to limit its basis of jurisdiction to "the perpetration of fraudulent acts
themselves." Id. The Second Circuit has not interpreted the language in Vencap to require
that the domestic conduct contain all the elements of a rule 10b-5 violation, but at least
one district court has made this interpretation. See FOF Proprietary Funds, Ltd., v. Arthur
Young & Co., 400 F. Supp 1219, 1222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
58 See Cornfield, 619 F.2d at 918.
59 Id. at 920-21. According to the court, the "[d]etermination whether American ac-
tivities 'directly' caused losses to foreigners depends not only on how much was done in
the United States but also on how much (here how little) was done abroad." Id.
(3 Id. at 920.
(11 Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 31-33.
62 Id. at 32-33. Judge Wald, in his concurring opinion, argued that the decisions
cited by the court as examples ofjudicial lawmaking clearly indicated that the "policies
adopted are those the court perceives as most consistent with the intent of Congress." Id.
at 37 (Wald, J., concurring).
63' Id. at 32.
64 Id. at 31.
65 Section 30(b) provides that "(tlhe provisions of this title ... shall not apply to any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States .... 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1983).
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markets. "66
Judge Bork's congressional intent analysis 67 was inconsistent
with his earlier statement that Congress did not consider the scope
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the securities laws. 68 The court
stated that the inquiry required the "unavoidable task of discerning a
purely hypothetical legislative intent."'69 The court also alluded to
the relatively "barren" text and legislative history of the 1934 Act
and cited several provisions that framed "a fairly broad grant of ju-
risdiction." '70 Judge Bork also noted that section 78c(a)(17) of the
1934 Act broadly defined interstate commerce to include " 'trade,
commerce, transportation, or communication ...between any for-
eign country and any State.' "71
The court added that a more restrictive test would have the de-
sirable effect of preserving judicial and law enforcement resources
for domestic affairs. 72 The court dismissed the jurisdictional tests
devised in the Third and Eighth circuits as essentially legislative deci-
sions. 73 Kasser and Continental, however, clearly indicate a desire to
further policies consistent with congressional intent of the antifraud
provisions. 74 Moreover, the Second Circuit suggested that allowing
the SEC to police fraudulent securities activities within the United
States, even when the securities were only sold to foreigners, was a
policy objective consistent with the intent of the enactors of the 1934
Act.
7 5
The court's purported adoption of the Second Circuit test dem-
onstrates a lack of sympathy for the plaintiffs' alternative theory of
jurisdiction. 76 Under the investors' test for finding jurisdiction, ac-
tivity that surrounds any given securities transaction should be con-
sidered as a single mass, and subject matter jurisdiction should be
asserted if the sum of domestic activities by all participants in a string
of transactions seems large enough to support jurisdiction in the fed-
eral courts. 77 Rejecting this contention, the court concluded that the
investors' jurisdictional test was "novel" and bore no relation to any
66 Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 30.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 32. The court quoted Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), in a parenthetical that reads: [w]hen ... a court is
confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of the United States courts
and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to other countries. Id.
(emphasis added.)
73 Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
74 See cases cited supra note 43.
75 See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975); see also supra note 35.
76 Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 36.
77 Id.
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of the tests for determining jurisdiction based on domestic conduct
adopted by any of the federal appellate courts. 78
Judge Bork's conclusion that the quantitative jurisdictional the-
ory proposed by the plaintiff in Zoelsch was "novel" does not square
with decisions from the Third and Eighth Circuits. 79 In Kasser the
Third Circuit emphasized that the quantity rather than the quality of
domestic activity should be considered in determining the jurisdic-
tional sufficiency of domestic conduct.80 Similarly, the Second Cir-
cuit in Cornfield concluded that the determination of whether the
American activities directly caused the losses to foreigners depends
on the amount of domestic activity relative to the amount of foreign
activity. 8 ' In contrast to Zoelsch, Kasser and Cornfield strongly suggest
the appropriateness and validity of a quantitative analysis.
Several desirable consequences may flow from the restrictive pa-
rameters of the Zoelsch test, including a reduced reliance by other
nations on U.S. regulation of international securities fraud. Courts
adopting the Zoelsch test will be more hesitant to extend jurisdiction
in securities fraud cases involving foreign litigants. 82 More stringent
jurisdictional standards may encourage foreign governments to reg-
ulate securities activities in their countries, allowing U.S. judicial and
law enforcement officials to concentrate on domestic or predomi-
nantly domestic disputes. 8 3
In the long run, however, the restrictive nature of the test may
produce significant adverse effects. Restricting subject matter juris-
diction for foreign litigants could send a signal to foreign investors
that claims of fraudulent conduct that occurs only partly in the
United States may not be adjudicated in U.S. courts. As a result, for-
eign investors may choose not to invest their funds in the United
States or in securities schemes involving U.S. participants.8 4 In addi-
78 Id.
79 See SEC v. Kasser, 549 F.2d 109, 115 (3d Cir.) (the "sum total" of the defendant's
actions within the United States must be considered before granting or denying jurisdic-
tion based on domestic conduct), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Note, Expanding The
Jurisdictional Basis For Transnational Securities Fraud Cases: A Minimal Conduct Approach, 6
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 321 n.84 (1983).
80 Kasser, 548 F.2d at 115.
81 Cornfield, 619 F.2d at 920-21; see also supra note 59.
82 See generally E. NEREP, EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION UNDER INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 551-55 (1983) (describing nonintervention as a fundamental principle pro-
tecting the sovereignty of nations).
83 See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
Whether the employment of the court's test in Zoelsch would significantly deter foreign
litigants from bringing their securities fraud claims in U.S. courts is not clear. Further-
more, law enforcement agencies will have to police domestic conduct with the employment
of any test. The stringent standards may encourage more fraudulent activity in the United
States. Law enforcement officials and courts, therefore, may find themselves devoting
more resources to fraudulent securities activities in the United States.
84 Thomas, supra note 1, at 453-54; Note, Anierican Adjudication of Transnational Securi-
ties Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV, 553, 570 (1976).
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tion, if other countries perceive U.S. jurisdictional policy as unfair
and unnecessarily restrictive, they may respond with countermea-
sures that could impede the free flow of investment capital in the
international marketplace.8 5 Possible countermeasures include the
employment of more restrictive jurisdictional standards for securities
fraud and similar claims brought in foreign forums, or the refusal to
act at all against defrauders seeking to transport securities fraud to
the United States.8 6 The refusal to grant jurisdiction when some
conduct took place in the United States and the defrauders used the
name of a reputable American accounting firm in its prospectus
could undermine the power of the SEC to monitor effectively securi-
ties activities in the United States.8 7
Furthermore, several commentators and judges detect a poten-
tial constitutional problem with the employment of different jurisdic-
tional standards for foreign and American plaintiffs.8 8  The
employment of stricter jurisdictional standards for foreign litigants
than for American litigants arguably constitutes a denial of due pro-
cess under the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment to
the Constitution. 9 Such discrimination may also conflict with U.S.
treaty commitments seeking to give citizens of certain countries and
resident U.S. citizens equal judicial treatment.90
The reasoning and logic behind the court's decision to employ a
restrictive jurisdictional test are unpersuasive. The court took the
jurisdictional tests devised by the Second Circuit a step further by
requiring more domestic activity for foreign litigants before a U.S.
district court can extend subject matter jurisdiction in transnational
fraud cases. Only the strongest claims can be heard. This analysis
suggests that the test is not a product of an interpretation of the ju-
85 Note, supra note 2, at 1311 n.6, 1321.
86 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (1977) (granting jurisdiction may encourage
other states to act against defrauders who seek to perpetrate frauds in the United States).
But see von Mehun, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63
B.U.L. REV. 279, 285-87 (1983) (providing examples of retaliatory measures taken in re-
sponse to the United States exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
87 Note, supra note 84, at 570.
88 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) (courts are bound to follow the congressional direction unless doing so would vio-
late the due process clause of the fifth amendment); Morgenstern, supra note 54, at 21
n.74 ("Refusal to find subject matter jurisdiction as to an alien when jurisdiction would
exist for an American may constitute a denial of due process under the equal protection
guarantee of the fifth amendment of the Constitution"). But cf Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 77 (1976) (concluding that a medicare supplemental medical insurance program den%-
ing eligibility to aliens unless they have been admitted for permanent residence in the
United States for five years does not violate the due process clause); Patel v. Sumani
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1987) (holding that an illegal alien may be a
person guaranteed equal protection and due process of law, but was not an individual
within the definition of employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act and thus had no
standing to sue).
80 Id.
o Note, supra note 84, at 570.
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risdictional scope of the 1934 Act or of a desire to follow the guid-
ance of the Second Circuit. The court ignored the Second Circuit's
jurisdictional approach in Cornfield and dismissed the Third and
Eighth Circuit precedent that supported the validity of the jurisdic-
tional theory set forth by the Zoelsch plaintiffs. The court appears to
have based its restrictive approach on policy objectives and judicial
conservatism. 91 The Zoelsch panel rejected the reasoning of other
circuits because these courts were persuaded by policy considera-
tions. At the same time, Judge Bork proposed a policy reason to
justify his own analysis.
Moreover, no authority supports the argument that the employ-
ment of the jurisdictional approach in Zoelsch will preserve effectively
the judicial resources of the United States. The United States has an
interest in adjudicating claims in which defrauders use the name of a
reputable American accounting firm, such as Arthur Andersen, in
connection with the sale of securities. 92 Reference to an American
corporation could mislead investors into believing that their invest-
ments are protected by U.S. securities laws. 93 Thus, in the long run,
the adoption of the Zoelsch test as the criterion for subject matter ju-
risdiction for foreign litigants may impede the free flow of invest-
ment capital to the United States. In effect by refusing to grant
jurisdiction in cases involving some fraudulent conduct in the United
States, courts will hinder SEC regulation of securities activities
within the United States-an objective foremost in the minds of the
enacters of the 1934 Act.
ELIZABETH M. ORAZEM
91 The opinion indicated that the court was concerned not only with preserving judi-
cial and law enforcement resources for domestic disputes, but also about the lack of uni-
form standards for subject matter jurisdiction for foreign litigants. Zoelsch v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Judge Bork also asserted that consider-
ations of"comity" were not significant in Zoelsch. Id. at 31. State sovereignty, however, is
relevant in a securities fraud case involving foreign plaintiffs and a foreign corporation.
Every assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction encroaches upon the sovereignty of another
national government. Note, supra note 2, at 1310 & n.1.
92 The United States has an interest in discouraging other "potential perpetrators of
fraud from taking advantage of American resources and prestige." Note, supra note 84, at
570.
93 Id.
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